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Defendants and Appellants 6200 South Associates, H. Roger 
Boyer and Kern C. Gardner (collectively referred to as "6200 South 
Associates"), submit the following Reply Brief of Appellants: 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
The only determinative constitutional provision, statute, 
ordinance or rule are Rules and 703 and 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence which are attached as Exhibit "A." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UDOT's Brief is a virtual confession of prejudicial error. It 
starts with UDOTfs witness, VanDrimmelen, intentionally set-up 
evidence on the inadmissible Chevron Oil offer. UDOT has no 
rational explanation as to how the Chevron offer can stand. 
Second, the ruling of the trial court in permitting UDOT, 
through its witness Clinger, to testify as to undefined and unknown 
properties with undefined access and without any evidentiary 
foundation was erroneous and highly prejudicial. UDOT's admission 
in its brief that the purpose of the evidence was to show that 
unknown "investors" were willing to invest unknown "resources" in 
unknown "properties" is the undoing of UDOT's masquerade. 
Third, to bar the Landowner's counsel from conducting cross-
examination, using hypothetical questions to test the validity and 
credibility of UD0Tfs experts, is now unquestioned error. It was 
prejudicial, particularly when combined with other error of trial. 
Fourth, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow 
UDOT to take the position at trial that the diamond interchange of 
1-215 BEFORE condemnation of the property in this case led to an 
insular county lane. UDOT had lost on that issue in a three-day 
bench trial before the lower court in which the court determined 
that the subject property should be considered as abutting upon I-
215 and ancillary roads because the freeway had been planned and 
property acquired for it in the early 1960s. But UDOT virtually 
scuttled the lower court ruling by having its appraisers take the 
position at trial that the diamond interchange, upon which the 
property abutted and as to which UDOT had committed under oath to 
build, was essentially of no value because the freeway would have 
dumped its traffic onto a patently unreasonable and unsafe 
secondary lane. By permitting UDOT to subvert the trial court's 
earlier bench ruling, the court essentially permitted its initial 
bench ruling to be overturned. 
In summary, the diseased Chevron offer allowing the jury to 
hear values of $12 - $18 per square foot for the remaining property 
suggested fundamentally, as UDOT argued, that UDOT did the 
Landowner a favor by condemning all of the property's prime access 
and air, light and view. The supposed curative instruction of the 
trial court only reinforced the evidence of the offer for it 
allowed the jury to consider existence of the offer with only the 
numbers having been stricken. That evidence, alone, warrants a 
reversal and new trial. Combined with the other imperfections as 
set out in this appeal, it fully justifies setting aside the 
judgment of the court and remanding the case for a new trial on the 




A THIRD PARTY OFFER ON THE 
LANDOWNERS1 PROPERTY IS FLATLY 
INADMISSIBLE AND CANNOT BE 
RATIONALIZED AS AN ADMISSION AGAINST 
INTERESTS OF 6200 SOUTH ASSOCIATES. 
A, The Chevron Offer from a Third Party Was Not Admissible. 
In the lower court, UDOT did not challenge the proposition 
that offers on a landowner's property made by a third party are 
inadmissible.1 UDOT cannot now raise that claim for the first time 
on appeal.2 UDOT, however, argued then and now argues3 that the 
tainted VanDrimmelen testimony regarding the purported Chevron Oil 
offer "may have been admissible as an admission against interest."4 
UDOT's argument is indefensible as a matter of law. Rule 
801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence puts the argument to rest: 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) his own statement, in either his 
individual or a representative capacity, or 
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his 
adoption or belief in its truth, . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) The plain reading of Rule 801(d)(2) demonstrates 
HjDOT's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant? s Motion for Additur or Alternatively for a New Trial at 
19-20 (R. 369-70) ("UDOT's Memo"). 
2E.g., State By & Through Its Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 
Utah 295, 495 P.2d 817, 821 (1972). 
3Appellee's Br. at 18-19. 
4UD0T's Memo at 3 (R. 353). 
3 
that, at minimum, an admission against interest must be a statement 
made by a "party-opponent," viz., by one of the partners of 6200 
South Associates. The authority cited and quoted in UDOT's Brief, 
at 18-19 specifically refers to "declarations by an owner,"5 
"admissions of a party . . . his agent . . . or by a privity,"6 or 
"any statement . . . made by a party."7 But VanDrimmelen! s 
evidence was that the statement came from a Chevron Oil employee.8 
Chevron was not a party-opponent and, thus, does not fall within 
Rule 801(d)(2). VanDrimmelen's testimony on the supposed Chevron 
offer was hearsay and fundamentally inadmissible. 
B. The Cases Cited by UDOT do not Support the Admissibility 
of VanDrimmelenfs Testimony On the Chevron Offer. 
On the critical question of admissibility of VanDrimmelenf s 
testimony on the Chevron offer, UDOT misstates the holdings it 
cites. It cites Nichols on Eminent Domain and three cases in 
support of the doubtful proposition that notwithstanding Rule 
801(d)(2), "an offer is admissible for the purpose of showing 
interest in property for a particular use."9 The cases do not so 
hold. 
In City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1960), 
the Missouri court held that testimony that there had been "a 
5Lake County Forest Preserve Dist. v. O'Malley, 421 N.E.2d 980 
(111. 1981). 
629 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 600 at 655. 
7Korleski v. Needham, 222 N.E.2d 334, 337 (111. 1966). 
8Tr. at 684-85 (R. 1103-04). 
9Appelleefs Br. at 9 (emphasis added). 
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marked number of inquiries" by persons interested in purchasing the 
land "was not the equivalent of an offer to buy, and was not 
inadmissible for the reasons . . • that an offer to buy is 
inadmissible." JEd. at 848 (emphasis added). The court found that 
there was no evidence of any offer in Vasquez. Thus, the case 
stands for the direct contrary of the proposition cited by UDOT. 
As Vasquez acknowledges, "an offer to buy is inadmissible." Id. 
UDOT quotes, as though it were law, pure dicta from Kelly v. 
Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny Co., 180 A.2d 39 (Pa. 1962). 
In that case counsel made a proffer of evidence that an offer had 
been made. The trial court ruled "I will not permit evidence of 
the price, but I will permit you to show that an offer was made." 
However, " [notwithstanding this ruling counsel . . . did not then 
produce any testimony of offers made." Id. at 44 (emphasis added). 
Because the issue in Kelly was whether the lower court erred in 
excluding the amount of the offer, and because the offer itself was 
never offered in evidence, Kelly is not the law of Pennsylvania on 
whether an offer is admissible for some other purpose than value. 
Much less is it the law of the State of Utah. 
Commonwealth Department of Highways v. Turner, 497 S.W.2d 57 
(Kan. 1973), like Vasquez, stands for the antithesis of the 
proposition cited by UDOT. The audacity of UDOT's citation of 
Turner is apparent when the language omitted from the quotation in 
UD0T?s brief is considered: 
The Commonwealth complains that over its 
objections the owners were permitted to 
introduce evidence of inquiries concerning the 
possible purchase or lease of the property. A 
5 
witness was asked whether he had been " . . . 
approached by any major oil company or any 
motel people or persons in business with 
shopping centers . . . " with respect to 
acquiring the property ". . .in the area that 
has been taken by the Commonwealth in this 
condemnation." Over an objection the witness 
was permitted to answer, which answer 
indicated that there had been such inquiries. 
[Another witness was similarly permitted to 
testify, yes or no, as to whether there had 
been such inquiri€js.] No witness was asked 
about prices or terms of any offer and the 
evidence was restricted to inquiries showing 
an interest in the property. It is our 
opinion that this evidence was properly 
admitted and did not fall into the category of 
offers, which, of course, may not be shown. 
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added). 
The statement by Nichols, supra, is without support, is 
vacuous and would turn eminesnt domain cases into a folly in which 
UDOT would be on the other side the great bulk of the time. It has 
only a trio of Missouri and Pennsylvania cases more than 30 years 
old which, on examination, do not stand for the proposition in 
support of which they are cited. 
Had UDOT's argument confined itself to a consideration of the 
implications of established Utah law in this area, it would have 
found that the policy of Utah eminent domain law is clearly 
inconsistent with the admissibility of offers by a third party. As 
the Utah Supreme Court observed in State v. Tedesco, 291 P.2d 1028 
(Utah 1956), a jury 
are not to inquire what a speculator might be 
able to realize out of a resale in the future, 
but what a present purchaser would be willing 
to pay for it in the condition it is now in. 
Id. at 1030. Utah thus finds itself among the vast majority of 
6 
jurisdictions of whom Nichols remarks, "it is thought best by most 
courts to reject evidence of offers altogether." 5 Nichols on 
Eminent Domain § 21.4[1]. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE 
JURY TO DISREGARD ALL OF UDOTf s 
EXPERTf s TESTIMONY REGARDING THE 
INADMISSIBLE CHEVRON OFFER TO 
PURCHASE AN UNDEFINED PORTION OF THE 
REMAINING PROPERTY. 
UDOT exacerbates the error of the trial court by arguing that 
6200 South Associates objected to the VanDrimmelen testimony, moved 
to strike the same, and that it was granted. From that UDOT 
contends that the Landowner "cannot complain where its objection 
has been sustained."10 UDOT is in error. 6200 South Associates1 
motion to strike went to all of VanDrimmelen1 s testimony on the 
Chevron offer. UDOT acknowledged the error but contended that only 
the alleged offering price should be stricken. The lower court 
agreed with UDOT, instructing the jury to disregard only the $12.00 
and $18.00 per square foot pricing terms. 
There now can be no doubt that UDOT was aware that the 
testimony relating to the Chevron offer would be blurted out by 
VanDrimmelen,11 UDOT does not even bother to assert otherwise in its 
10Appellee Br. at 13-14. 
nIn a moment of candor, in argument on appellant's motion to 
strike this portion of Mr. VanDrimmelen's testimony, Mr. Coleman 
for UDOT stated as follows: 
Your Honor, I would agree with counsel that 
the amount should not have come in. I did not 
anticipate that they would. . . . 
7 
brief. While it is true that the Court initially sustained the 
Landowners' objection to the inadmissible Chevron offer,12 that 
objection only could be made after the testimony came in because 
the question did not illicit testimony relating to an offer: the 
question did not even mention the word "offer." After counsel 
argued the point outside of the jury's presence, the lower court 
gave the following instruction to the jury: 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the 
presence of the jury, the alternative, counsel 
and the parties. Ladies and gentlemen, it is 
not uncommon for the Court, in a trial of this 
complexity and this duration, to occasionally 
tell the jury to just disregard something they 
have heard. The Court is telling you to do 
that. It happens occasionally. And the Court 
has confidence in the maturity and the 
responsibility of the jurors to the extent 
that they will do as the Court tells them. 
There has been some testimony given by 
the witness now on the stand [VanDrimmelen] 
regarding statements made by a Mr. Jacobsen, 
and confined by Chevron Oil, regarding the 
value of the questioned property per square 
foot. Specifically, there was a reference of 
$18 per square foot with access, $12 per 
square foot without access. Supposedly, that 
value was confirmed by a representative of 
Chevron Oil. Disregard that portion of the 
expert witness' testimony that referred to 
that subject matter. 
Tr. 700-01 (R. 1119-20) (emphasis added).13 
The curative instruction the lower court gave to the jury, 
therefore, did not solve the problem. The jury was left to 
12Tr. 685-86 (R. 1104-05). 
13The original testimony and ruling, the argument of counsel, 
the Court's ruling, and the Court's instructions to the jury are 
reproduced in full in attached Exhibit "B" hereto. 
8 
consider in its deliberations that Chevron had made an offer for an 
undefined portion of the property. UDOT did not lay any foundation 
as to whether the supposed Chevron offer covered one-tenth of an 
acre, five acres, or all of the remaining 18.7 acres. It was not, 
as UDOT contends, the Landowner's obligation to emphasize 
inadmissible testimony. 
The whole VanDrimmelen saga as staged and orchestrated was 
highly prejudicial to 6200 South Associates. Most of 
VanDrimmelen's testimony on Chevron remained before the jury. Only 
the "technicality" of the price per square foot was struck, with 
many of the jurors having every reason to believe that the Chevron 
offer was most relevant, but for some esoteric reason in the law, 
the so-called offering price could not remain. The damage from 
this tainted and incompetent testimony was sought and achieved by 
UDOT. 
There is an almost fatuous contradiction to the staged 
VanDrimmelen testimony. He had contended to the point of advocacy 
throughout his testimony that the property could not have 
commercial potential or use BEFORE or AFTER the taking because the 
Landowner could not obtain commercial zoning.14 On the other 
hand, the Landowner never took the position that the remaining 
property in the AFTER condition had commercial potential or use.15 
What then, one must ask, was the basis of VanDrimmelen' s testimony 
of the supposed Chevron Oil offer? Clearly, this Chevron testimony 
14Tr. at 683-84 & 686 (lines 19-21) (R. 1102-03 & 1105). 
15Cook [Tr. 289 (R. 709)]; Brown [Tr. 472 (R. 891)]. 
9 
of $12 - $18 per square foot was not in rebuttal to the Landowner's 
testimony and it contradicted VanDrimmelen's own opinion on use and 
value AFTER the taking. 
The answer to the question and to the VanDrimmelen nonsequitur 
lies in the fact that by this diseased Chevron offer, UDOT was able 
to get before the jury the hocus-pocus values of $12 - $18 per 
square foot for some undefined portion of the remaining property 
AFTER the taking, when both the Landowner fs and UDOTfs testimony as 
to land value BEFORE the taking ranged between $2.50 and $4.00 per 
square foot. Quite obviously, the $12 - $18 per square foot price 
would have had to refer to commercial use and value. Accordingly, 
even though the Chevron testimony cut squarely against 
VanDrimmelenf s unrelenting opinion against commercial use and value 
AFTER the taking, it was worth it to UDOT, for it planted in the 
jury's mind the distinct possibility that the remaining property 
could be worth as much as six times more AFTER than it was BEFORE 
condemnation. Thus, UDOT could argue (as it did) that UDOT had 
done the Landowners a favor by condemning all of their prime access 
and that the Landowners had achieved, consequently, an 
extraordinary windfall. Therein lies the irreparable prejudice and 
reversible error from which UDOT cannot escape.16 
16Utah Department of Transportation v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 
481 (Utah 1979). 
10 
POINT III. 
UDOT'S ARGUMENT WITH REGARD TO THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF UNDEFINED 
PROPERTIES IN DOCTORED PHOTOGRAPHS 
IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT AND VACUOUS. 
ALONE, IT REQUIRES A REVERSAL OF THE 
JUDGMENT AND A NEW TRIAL. 
UDOTfs justification for the use by its witness, dinger, of 
tampered photographs demonstrating undefined and unknown properties 
as evidence of access in the case is rapacious and without any 
authority. UDOT proffered and the trial court allowed, over 
consistent objection of the Landowner, dinger's half-a-dozen 
photographs of various freeway interchanges in which properties 
were situated in varying degrees of proximity. But the record is 
absolutely clear that: 
1. dinger did not identify one, single property by 
demonstrating its size, shape, means of access, zoning or 
any other element of relevance to the subject property; 
2. dinger did not identify the properties by ownership, by 
sale that had taken place, by a comparison of a sale with 
and without freeway influence; 
3. There was not a scrap of evidence to indicate the ability 
of the photographed properties to compete, whether the 
land and improvements could be reasonably used in the 
market, the nature of businesses or their condition; 
4. To sum up, UDOTfs dinger offered not a shred of evidence 
about any properties or their use — merely aerial 
photographs of several interchanges in the metropolitan 
Salt Lake area. 
11 
UDOTfs confession of what dinger's use of the photographs and 
the "phantom" properties should not be lost on this Court, UDOT 
writes in its brief as follows: 
Mr. Clinger testified regarding five 
developments on or near interchanges that had 
been developed for commercial - business type 
uses. The purpose was to show that investors 
had been willing to invest considerable 
resources to develop properties with access 
restrictions similar to the subject. 
UDOT Br. at 21-22. 
Of course, the* burning questions are what property or 
assortment of properties constituted "five developments?" What 
"investors" were willing to "invest considerable resources?" "What 
properties had access restrictions similar to the subject?" UDOT 
had no answer to any of these questions for this Court in its 
appeal brief or at trial, either on direct examination or on cross-
examination by the Landowner. The law requires otherwise. RDA 
of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974); 
(see citation of Utah authorities in Appellants1 Opening Br. at 24, 
fn. 5.) The photographs of undefined and unknown properties were 
introduced without required foundation and UDOTf s argument thereon 
is vacuous. 
UD0Tfs argument that the doctored photographs were admissible 
simply because Clinger stated he had taken the photographs into 
account in forming his opinion must be rejected. Acceptance of 
that argument would permit UDOT to manufacture a rule of law that 
so long as a party could get an expert witness to say that a 
certain factor was taken into account, such factor would be 
12 
admissible. Such an argument would lead straight to the 
proposition that the expert witness and not the court would 
determine admissibility of elements to support an expert opinion. 
It would allow in this case, for example, the appraiser to use a 
photograph of unknown properties in Chicago or Los Angeles without 
any foundation. 
UDOTf s position on this Point of the appeal makes a travesty 
of the law and of Utah Rules of Evidence 703. That Rule permits an 
expert to predicate an opinion upon information "reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field." There was no evidence 
produced through dinger or otherwise that the photographs showing 
the unknown and undefined properties with unknown and undefined 
access is information that that is ordinarily relied upon by 
appraisal experts. 
The admission of the "sheen green" photographs was prejudicial 
error by the trial court and requires a reversal and new trial. 
POINT IV. 
THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON THE 
LANDOWNERSf CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 
UDOT's EXPERT WITNESSES UTILIZING 
HYPOTHETICALS NOT BASED UPON 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WAS IMPROPER 
AND PREJUDICIAL. 
UDOT argues in its brief that "some" hypothetical questions 
were allowed on cross examination by the Landowner of UDOTf s 
experts, and therefore, the Landowner was given an ample 
opportunity to cross-examine UDOT's expert appraisal witnesses. 
That contention is ill-conceived. UDOT's brief at 27, 28. 
The fact that some of hypothetical questions were allowed is 
13 
not relevant. One hypothetical question lays the foundation for a 
point which tests the expert's opinion only after following 
hypotheticals have been asked. It may not be until the last 
question is asked that the point to which the hypothetical cross-
examination is directed may be established, resulting in the 
expert's confession of error, confusion or unreasonableness. The 
substantial relationship between access to property and the 
property's value was a lynch pin question in the entire case. The 
trial judge cut off hypothetical cross examination regarding it. 
Cross-examining an experienced government witness may be one 
of the most difficult tasks facing the trial lawyer. To impose 
unwarranted restrictions on cross-examination as was done in this 
case, chokes off the development of evidence necessary to a 
reasoned verdict. Utah case law encourages cross-examination 
utilizing hypotheticals wherther or not found upon facts in the 
record. In a landmark case decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 
1953, State of Utah v. Peek, 265 P.2d 630 (Utah 1953), the high 
Court specifically declared: 
A witness who has given an opinion of value 
may . . . in the discretion of the court, be 
asked questions on cross examination, fore the 
purpose of testing his opinion, which would be 
improper upon direct examination. He may, for 
example, be ask€>d how far certain assumed 
facts would modify his judgment. . . . 
Id. at 638. 
Why UDOT fails to cite the above-quoted portion of Peek is not 
answered. UDOT's reliance upon a 90 year old case, Nichols v. 
Oregon Shortline R.R. Company, 25 Utah 240, 70 P. 996 (1902), is 
14 
misplaced. A careful examination of the facts in Nichols clearly 
demonstrates that the principle for which UDOT cites the case is 
not the law. The holding of the Utah Court in Nichols was that a 
hypothetical question on cross-examination was required to contain 
all material facts in the record relating to the matter. If the 
question omitted any material fact, it was improper. That has not 
been the law in Utah for at least 40 years. 
UDOT's argument is flawed. The trial judge clearly erred 
prejudicially in failing to permit hypothetical questions to be 
asked of UD0Tfs experts on the critical subject of loss of access. 
POINT V. 
UDOT!s EXPERTS INTENTIONALLY 
DISTORTED THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 
TOTAL PROPERTY BEFORE CONDEMNATION 
TO THE 1-215 FREEWAY AND SUPPORTING 
ROADS, WHICH D I S T O R T I O N 
SUBSTANTIALLY CIRCUMVENTED THE LOWER 
COURT'S PRIOR RULING. 
A strange paradox developed in the trial of this case. After 
several days of a bench trial, legal memoranda and oral argument, 
the lower court properly ruled that the 1-215 Project, in all of 
its aspects, had to be taken into account in determining market 
value of the subject property as of the date of taking. It would 
have defied not only common sense, but virtually every aspect of 
public highway planning for the 1-215 Diamond Interchange to have 
been constructed (as was necessarily assumed) in the Court's ruling 
without supporting and corollary access roads to feed the 
interchange. UDOT was clearly aware of that fact and had shown a 
connector road to the interchange (whether Diamond or Urban) long 
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before the 1989 Urban Interchange was finalized and 6200 South 
Associates' property was condemned. 
Nonetheless, at trial, UDOT intentionally distorted the BEFORE 
condition of the subject property under the guise that the Diamond 
Interchange would dump its traffic on to patently inadequate county 
lane at 6200 South. The trial evidence of the Landowners properly 
assumed that the express connector road from the mouth of Big 
Cottonwood Canyon would tie the diamond Interchange of 1-215. For 
UDOT to rest its case on the premise that the 1979 Diamond 
Interchange would be hobbled with an unsafe and improper secondary 
lane undermined and mocked the earlier ruling of the lower court. 
The introduction of that evidence at trial was error for which 
a new trial should be granted. 
POINT VI. 
THE FACT THAT THE JURY VERDICT IS IN 
THE RANGE OF THE APPRAISAL ESTIMATES 
IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE IN THIS APPEAL 
WHERE THE APPEAL IS ON ISSUES OF LAW 
OTHER THAN INADEQUACY OF THE 
VERDICT. 
UDOT claims that there is no reversible error because the jury 
verdict was within the range of the appraisers1 testimony.17 That 
is only the presumption where the inadequacy of the award, as a 
matter of law, is appealed. The Landowner has not raised that 
issue in this appeal. Rather, it is the individual and cumulative 
weight of the prejudicial errors addressed in the Landowner's 
Opening Brief that resulted in a skewed and improper jury verdict 
UDOT Br. at 39-40. 
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favorable to UDOT. The low amount of the jury verdict only 
emphasizes the significance and prejudice of the errors. 
The effect of the inadmissible Chevron offer and the undefined 
property photos, alone, in the minds of the jury is readily 
apparent when the jury verdict is compared against the expert 
appraiser's testimony . . . the jury verdict almost adopts one or 
the other of UDOT's expert appraisers' position on value of the 
property taken and severance damage. After the testimony regarding 
the inadmissible Chevron offer and the unknown and undefined 
interchange properties, the jury was left with the impression that 
UDOT did the Landowner a favor by taking all of the properties' 
prime access.18 
CONCLUSION 
The difficulties apparent in UDOT's answering brief makes it 
clear that the trial court committed prejudicial error at trial. 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and a new trial 
ordered on the issue of just compensation in the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. C A M F B 4 ^ J ^ 3 K J ' / Z^ 
KEVIN E. ANDERSON 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 6200 South Associates, 
H. Roger Boyer and Kern C. Gardner 
January 13, 1993. 
18See Tr. a t 759-60 (R. 1177-78) . 
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Exhibit A 
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts. 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or 
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual 
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a 
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Exhibit B 
has been left, that there is a probability, as of February 
1988, that this property could have been zoned commercial, do 
you? 
THE WITNESS: Not zoned commercial, no. 
MR. CAMPBELL: We object to the question on the 
grounds that it calls for speculation. There is no foundation 
for it. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Do you understand the 
question? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: You may answer it. 
A. Supposing that it were zoned commercial, could — I 
have forgotten the question. 
Q. (By Mr. Coleman) Physically, would this property be 
accessible, given the configuration of the property in the 
after condition? 
MR. CAMPBELL: Objection. That's vague and 
ambiguous as to what this property were accessible — I mean, 
that has no definitive statement. I object to it. 
THE COURT: Do you understand the question? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: You may answer. Overruled. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would your reason for that conclusion be? 
A. Three reasons. Number one, there are many examples 
684 
1 of commercial development that are located near interchanges, 
2 that are not accessible just off of the interchange. So just 
3 by comparability, you could do it. 
4 The second reason is that in a discussion with Heber 
5 Jacobsen, when I was — met with him, he informed me that he 
6 had been negotiating with Chevron Oil to put a convenience 
7 store on the northeast corner of this site. And I believe 
8 that he — in fact, he did state — I have in my notes — he 
9 was negotiating at $18 a square foot. But if the access — if 
10 it was not accessible off of Big Cottonwood Canyon Road, that 
11 the offering price was somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 to 
12 12. I called Chevron Oil, to ask them if this was the case. 
13 They confirmed it. They did confirm the $18. And they said 
14 that Al Frandsen, I spoke with — he said that the 
15 accessibility off of Big Cottonwood Canyon, he would like to 
16 have it, but knew that he couldn't have it, and he is willing 
17 to pay $18 -a square foot — 
18 MR. CAMPBELL: I am going to object to this. This 
19 has been — this whole area of examination has been framed to 
20 get in this one statement. I am going to object to it. I am 
21 going to ask that the entire area go out, and this witness1 
22 last statement that somebody was willing to offer something is 
23 clearly not evidence in this courtroom. The Supreme Court has 
24 spoken on this time and again. I object to it. 
25 THE COURT: The portion of the answer that related 
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to a negotiated offer will be stricken from the record. The 
rest of the answer will remain. You may proceed with the 
balance of your answer. 
A. Nevertheless, Mr. Frandsen did indicate that he 
would pay the same price for an access off of 30th East, would 
love to have that location. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I am going to object to that, as 
well. It is just the same thing. It is just a — it is the 
same answer. It is just simply disguised in wolf's clothing. 
I object to it. 
THE COURT: Technically, the objection is correct. 
The objection is sustained. Answer the rest of the question. 
A. I don't know what else to answer, except to say 
that — 
MR. CAMPBELL: The witness has answered the 
question, along with many others. 
THE COURT: Have you answered the question fully, to 
your satisfaction? 
THE WITNESS: I guess just a point of clarification, 
and that is that I doubt that they would — I don't believe 
that they would ever get the zoning for it. 
MR. CAMPBELL: If the Court please, this has 
absolutely no — this witness now is in the area of talking 
about the probability of rezoning. It stemmed from the very 
issue we just discussed with the Court at the bench. That was 
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1 THE COURT: Does the question or the answer assume 
2 that the property would be zoned commercially? 
3 MR. CAMPBELL: Indeed, it did. And there is no 
4 evidence before the Court, and that is not the position of the 
5 State in this case. I mean, they have indicated to the Court 
6 that they were not going to make the claim that this property 
7 had now had an increased or higher use to put the property to 
8 after the taking, that there was no benefits. 
9 THE COURT: What is your response to the Court's 
10 question about the reframing of the question? 
11 MR. CAMPBELL: May I continue? 
12 THE COURT: Let's clear that matter up first. 
13 MR. CAMPBELL: I think that that did not clear up 
14 anything. I indicated to the Court, at the bench, that, 
15 indeed, that what Counsel said is I want you to assume a 
16 commercial use on the property. That was the first 
17 question. That's what brought my objection. And the Court 
18 then suggested to Counsel, if you were to ask the question, if 
19 the property were to be used for commercial purposes, is there 
20 accessibility? At least that's the way that the question was 
21 put. Is there accessibility to the remaining property, for 
22 that sort of use? 
23 Judge, it became very clear that is not the case of 
24 the State. They don't maintain that position. There was only 
25 one reason for that testimony to come in, and that was so that 
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this witness -- it was a set-up deal in this courtroom. It 
was a framed question, so that that witness could testify as 
to a statement or a conversation with one of the partners in 
the partnership, Jacobsen. 
And he went on to testify, over objection, if the 
Court please, that the property would have had a value of $18 
a foot, square foot, but that without any access the property 
could still have maybe $12 a square foot. That, your Honor, 
is absolute inflammatory evidence. It is to suggest to the 
Court and jury, clearly, it is relevant, is this property 
worth $12 a square foot after the taking? That's what this 
evidence points to. There is no other way that anybody can 
justify or sustain the relevancy of it. 
And, your Honor, the difficulty I have with that is 
that that question was a setup, and, fortunately, while I 
didn't know it was coming at the time, it was very clear, that 
I approached the Court and asked the Court for leave to find 
out, where are we going with a question like this? I mean, I 
said to the Court, suppose they ask him to assume that the 
property could be zoned C-3 for skyscrapers. Is there access 
for that? 
And I submit to the Court that that was wholly 
hypothetical and speculative, and that, in fact, the question 
was set up, it doesn't play a part of their case in chief at 
all, Judge. You asked counsel for the State, how is this 
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relevant to your case on compensation? And it isn't. There 
is no testimony to that effect, except for the highly 
prejudicial statement about this conversation. 
When I first heard it, I thought it may be an 
admission of a party opponent. Therefore, I can't object to 
that. But it turned out to be much more than that. It turned 
out to be a statement with regard to an offer. Offers are not 
admissible before this Court. 
There are at least three reasons why this testimony 
ought to go out. If I have to cross-examine in this area, 
then I run the risk of just reemphasizing the very issue. It 
is highly inflammatory. It comes in this case after nearly a 
week of trial, in which this Court has closely guarded its 
rules on evidence. While it has been, admittedly, liberal in 
many of its rulings, yet it was very, very clear that this was 
not part of the case in chief of the State, nor is it in 
rebuttal to any testimony of the landowner. It is highly 
inflammatory. 
If it is allowed to stand, then it can be argued. I 
submit to the Court that there is no answer to that, that I 
can give, because if the Court allowed it in, it must have 
relevance. And it doesn't have any relevancy. As I say, on 
top of it, it doesn't carry the good faith that is required of 
a party in submitting a case in chief. It was a setup for the 
Court. 
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Unfortunately, the jury has now heard the evidence. 
I think with a proper instruction at this time — that's why I 
have asked for the time at this moment — the Court can 
correct that. But, otherwise, it will become very significant 
and perhaps very prejudicial. When somebody starts talking 
about $18 a square foot, but, oh, dear, if you don't have any 
access, maybe only $12 a square foot. Those are offers, 
Judge. And they are absolutely irrelevant and improper. 
THE COURT: Response? 
MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I would agree with Counsel 
that the amounts should not have come in. I did not 
anticipate that they would. The purpose — 
THE COURT: How do you propose that the Court deal 
with that matter, without emphasizing the problem of which 
Counsel complains? 
MR. COLEMAN: As far as the amount is concerned, I 
don't know, your Honor. That shouldn't have come in, the 
amount. And the purpose for the testimony was to indicate 
that in the after condition, if there was a demand for 
commercial property in the before, it was still there in the 
after. And the problem is the defendants, in their case in 
chief, indicated that the highest and best use of the property 
in the before condition was commercial, had some commercial 
value, and highest and best use. The plaintiff's position 
was — is, and has been, that it did not have a commercial 
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1 highest and best use in the before condition, it had a highest 
2 and potential best use in office space. 
3 The reason for bringing the testimony out with this 
4 witness, with regard to inquiries respecting commercial 
5 development in the after, it was to show that if this property 
6 could have been used for commercial purposes in the before 
7 condition, it could have been used for commercial purposes in 
8 the after condition. Simply put, that is it in a nutshell. 
9 That if this property had any commercial potential in the 
10 before, it also had it in the after. Simply put, that's it. 
11 Nothing more, and nothing less. 
12 THE COURT: How do you propose that we correct the 
13 portion of the expert witness1 answer relating to values? 
14 MR. COLEMAN: The only way I can suggest, your 
15 Honor, is that the testimony with regard to the values be 
16 stricken and disregarded by the jury. I don't know of another 
17 way of doing it. 
18 THE COURT: Anything else? 
19 MR. COLEMAN: No, your Honor, that's all. 
20 THE COURT: Response? 
21 MR. CAMPBELL: Quickly, the State's argument just 
2 2 simply won't hunt. It just — that dog won't hunt, because 
23 the witness wasn't talking about the fair market value of the 
24 property before the taking. The question specifically ran to 
5 what the use of the property would be after the taking. And o 
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1 we haven't claimed — heaven's sakes, we haven't claimed in 
2 this case that this property could be used for commercial 
3 purposes in the condition in which it has been left- So it 
4 didn't go to any rebuttal. We have been substantially 
5 prejudiced as a consequence of this. I submit that the entire 
6 area ought to go out, not just the area with regard to the 
7 offers, but — specifically, as to those, it ought to -- but 
8 also the entire area of examination ought to go out. 
9 THE COURT: The Court is disinclined to throw the 
10 baby out with the bath water. If Counsel, between you, can 
11 agree on a surgically clean method of excising the reference 
12 to the value, the Court believes that, with all of the 
13 testimony the jurors have heard the last several days, this 
14 particular testimony is not going to have any significant 
15 impact for or against either party. The Court will instruct 
16 the jury according to its own assessment of the problem, or 
17 the Court will instruct the jury pursuant to a stipulation of 
18 both counsel, either way. 
19 MR. CAMPBELL: I believe in the Court's wisdom. The 
20 Court has conducted this trial very ably. The Court can — as 
21 ruled on my motion — I am not prepared to stipulate to how it 
22 is done, but I think the Court certainly, in — as I say, in 
23 exercising the clear wisdom it has, can take care of the 
24 problem. 
25 THE COURT: The Court proposes to instruct the jury 
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1 to disregard any reference by the witness now on the stand to 
2 value of the property as it related to an alleged statement by 
3 Mr. Jacobsen on the $18 before, $12 — $18 with, $12 without 
4 the access. 
5 MR. COLEMAN: I think he followed that up, also, 
6 with testimony from a representative of Chevron Oil, where the 
7 testimony — where the conversation with the representative 
8 from Chevron Oil was that there wouldn't be any difference in 
9 the value, even with the restriction of access. 
10 MR. CAMPBELL: That's when the objection came in, 
11 your Honor. So that the whole area — 
12 THE COURT: The defendants1 motion to strike those 
13 portions of the testimony previously referred to, relating to 
14 the $18 versus the $12 value of the questioned property, and 
15 the confirming reference by Chevron Oil regarding those 
16 values, will be stricken from the record. Counsel are not to 
17 refer to them in argument or in any further proceedings. 
18 Bring the jury back. 
19 (The jury returned to the courtroom.) 
20 THE COURT: The record will reflect the presence of 
21 the jury, the alternate, counsel and the parties. Ladies and 
22 gentlemen, it is not uncommon for the Court, in a trial of 
23 this complexity and this duration, to occasionally tell the 
24 jury to just disregard something they have heard. The Court 
25 is telling you to do that. It happens occasionally. And the 
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Court has confidence in the maturity and the responsibility of 
the jurors to the extent that they will do as the Court tells 
them. 
There has been some testimony given by the witness 
now on the stand regarding statements made by a Mr. Jacobsen, 
and confirmed by Chevron Oil, regarding the value of the 
questioned property per square foot. Specifically, there was 
a reference of $18 per square foot with access, $12 per square 
foot without access. Supposedly, that value was confirmed by 
a representative of Chevron Oil. Disregard the portion of the 
expert witness1 testimony that referred to that subject 
matter. 
You may proceed. 
MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, just a housekeeping item, 
we had offered Plaintiff's Exhibit 17. I don't know if that 
was admitted. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I think the Court — 
THE COURT: In light of the Court's ruling, is the 
exhibit appropriate otherwise? 
MR. CAMPBELL: I think Counsel did offer it, and the 
Court — I had an objection to it, because of the method that 
this witness used, and the Court said that is a matter of 
cross-examination. 
THE COURT: It is. The exhibit is received. You 
may proceed. 
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